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THIRD PARTY LIABILITY FOR WITHHOLDING
TAXES: SECTION 3505
INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted section 3505 of the Internal Revenue Code,1 which
became effective January 1, 1967, and extended liability for the pay-
ment of withholding taxes to persons, other than employers, who furnish
payroll funds. The provision was enacted to combat tax avoidance
through the practice of "net payroll financing."2 Prior to the inception
of section 3505, sureties who had guaranteed the obligations of default-
ing contractors would often provide the contractors with funds sufficient
to pay the net wages of the contractor's employees, but insufficient to
pay withholding taxes.' Similar practices were employed by prime
contractors who paid the wages of subcontractors' employees.4 Since
the wages had been reduced by the amount of the withholding taxes
1. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 3505 provides:
(a) Direct payment by third parties. -For purposes of sections 3102, 3202,
3402, and 3403, if a lender, surety, or other person, who is not an employer
under such sections with respect to an employee or group of employees,
pays wages directly to such an employee or group of employees, employed by
one or more employers, or to an agent on behalf of such employee or em-
ployees, such lender, surety, or other person shall be liable in his own person
and estate to the United States in a sum equal to the taxes (together with in-
terest) required to be deducted and withheld from such wages by such em-
ployer.
(b) Personal liability where funds are supplied. -If a lender, surety, or other
person supplies funds to or for the account of an employer for the specific
purpose of paying wages of the employees of such employer, with actual notice
or knowledge (within the meaning of section 6323(i)(1)) that such em-
ployer does not intend to or will not be able to make timely payment or
deposit of the amounts of tax required by this subtitle to be deducted and
withheld by such employer from such wages, such lender, surety, or other per-
son shall be liable in his own person and estate to the United States in a sum
equal to the taxes (together with interest) which are not paid over to the
United States by such employer with respect to such wages. However, the
liability of such lender, surety, or other person shall be limited to an amount
equal to 25 percent of the amount so supplied to or for the account of such
employer for such purpose.
(c) Effect of payment. -Any amounts paid to the United States pursuant to
this section shall be credited against the liability of the employer.
2. Hearings on H.R. 11256 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1966).
3. Id. at 86.
4. Id. at 83.
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due, the taxes were not assessable against employees,u nor were the
taxes collectable from the defaulting contractor or subcontractor who
had no funds to pay them.
Before the passage of section 3505, third parties who furnished pay-
roll funds could not be held liable for the withholding taxes. Efforts
to collect withholding taxes from sureties were hampered by judicial
determinations that taxes were not wages and hence not covered by
the typical sureties bond.6  Similarly, judicial construction of the exist-
ing statutory scheme prevented recovery of withholding taxes from other
third parties, such as prime contractors.
The government attempted to counter the practice of net payroll
financing with sections 3402(a)7 and 6672 of the Internal Revenue
5. INT. REV. CODE of 1939, § 1608 (now INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 3307) pro-
vided, as to amounts which an employer was required or permitted to deduct from the
remuneration of an employee, that, "for the purposes of this subchapter the amount so
deducted shall be considered to have been paid to the employee at the time of such
deduction."
6. The rationale of this doctrine may be traced to United States Fidelity and
Guar. Co. v. United States, 201 F.2d 118, 121 (10th Cir. 1952), where the court held
that the employee's full wages was the difference between his gross pay and his with-
holding taxes. Under this logic, the sureties were liable under their bonds only for
the net wages of employees. Despite tenacious frontal attacks on the United States
Fidelity doctrine that taxes were not wages within the coverage of a surety's bond, the
doctrine was repeatedly affirmed by the federal courts. See, e.g., United States v.
Crosland Constr. Co., 120 F. Supp. 792 (E.D.S.C.), a! 'd, 217 F.2d 275 (4th Cir.
1954); Westover v. William Simpson Constr. Co., 209 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1954);
General Casualty Co. of America v United States, 205 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1953).
However, the Government's efforts finally proved successful in United States v. Phoe-
nix Indem. Co., 231 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1956). In Phoenix, the construction con-
tract required the contractor to pay taxes collectible because of the work, and the
surety's performance bond was a broadly worded guaranty to perform the conditions
of the contract. On facts substantially the same as United States Fidelity, supra, the
court held that the bond made the Government a beneficiary. The Fifth Circuit
distinguished its own decision in Crosland, supra, because the bond that Phoenix In-
demnity issued "covered not only the obligation of the employer to pay the wages
earned by his employees but also to pay the taxes collectable because of the work."
Id. at 573. The decision reached in Phoenix was not followed in subsequent cases.
E.g., United States v. Hill, 368 F.2d 617, 625 (5th Cir. 1966); United States v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 323 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1963); United States v. Seaboard Supply
Co., 201 F. Supp. 630 (N.D. Tex. 1961); First Nat'l Bank v. New York, 177 F. Supp.
175 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). But cf. Home Indem. Co. v. F. H. Donovan Painting Co.,
325 F.2d 870 (8th Cir. 1963). For a discussion of the general types of problems that
may arise with respect to surety bonds, see Cushman, Surety Bonds on Federal Con-
struction Contracts: Current Decisions Reviewed, 25 FoRHaM L. REv. 241 (1956).
7. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 3402(a), formerly INT. REv. CODE of 1939,
§ 1622(a), which provides:
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Code of 1954. To establish the liability of a third party for the payment
of withholding taxes under section 3402(a), it was necessary to show
that he was an employer.' The section's effectiveness was hindered
severely when courts consistently held that a third party who furnished,
but lacked control' over the actual payment of, wages was not an em-
ployer within the meaning of the Code." Section 6672 provides inter
alia that a "person" responsible ior the collection of withholding taxes
who fails to do so will be liable for a penalty equal to the tax uncol-
lected." Section 6672, unlike section 3402(a), had no predecessor in
Income tax collected at source
(a) Requirement of withholding. -Every employer making payment of wages
shall deduct and withhold upon such wages (except as otherwise provided in
this section) a tax determined in accordance with the following tables. For
purposes of applying such tables, the term "the amount of wages" means the
amount by which the wages exceed the number of withholding exemptions
claimed, multiplied by the amount of one such exemption as shown in the table
in subsection (b)(1).
8. INT. R v. CODE of 1954, § 6672.
9. INT. RFv. CODE of 1954, § 3401(d), defines employer in terms of control.
That section provides:
For purposes of this chapter, the term "employer" means the person for whom
an individual performs or performed any service, of whatever nature, as the
employee of such person, except that-
(1) if the person for whom the individual performs or performed the serv-
ices does not have control of the payment of the wages for such services, the
term "employer" (except for purposes of subsection (a)) means the person
having control of the payment of such wages, and
(2) in the case of a person paying wages on behalf of a non resident alien
individual, foreign partnership, or foreign corporation, not engaged in trade or
business within the United States the term "employer" (except for purposes of
subsection (a) ) means such person.
10. When the Code speaks of "control" over the payment of wages as in § 3401
(d) (see note 9 supra), it means the legal power to control the actual payment of wages
rather than merely what actually may have been practiced by voluntary forebearance.
Educational Fund of Elect. Indus. v. United States, 426 F.2d 1053, 1057 (2d Cir.
1970); Century Indem. Co. v. Riddell, 317 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1963).
11. See Century Indem. Co. v. Riddell, 317 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1963); General
Cas. Co. v. United States, 205 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1954); United States v. Crosland
Const. Co., 120 F. Supp. 792 (E.D.S.C.), aff'd, 217 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1954); Ameri-
can Fidelity Co. v. Delaney, 114 F. Supp. 702 (D. Vt. 1953); United States v. Zschach
Constr. Co., 110 F. Supp. 551 (E.D. Okla. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 209 F.2d 347
(10th Cir. 1954). Similarly prime contractors who advanced money for wages to sub-
contractors were held not to be employers of the subcontractors' employees. Westover
v. William Simpson Constr. Co., 209 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1954); Arthur Venneri Co. v.
United States, 340 F.2d 337 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
12. Section 6672 of Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is commonly referred to as
the "100 percent penalty provisions." See Cable, One Hundred Percent Penalty Assess-
ments, 42 TAXEs 507 (1964). That section provides:
Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax
imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully account
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the 1939 Code, and it was argued that the enactment of the section
evinced a Congressional purpose to expand third party liability for the
payment of withholding taxes.'" The two sections, however, were
treated as largely duplicative. The term "person" in section 6672 was
generally construed as meaning "employer"'14 or an employer's officers
or agents.' 5 While a few decisions indicated that a third party might
fall within section 6672 when he was not an employer or an employer's
officer or agent,16 section 6672 was largely ineffective against the prac-
for and pay over such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to evade or de-
feat such tax or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties pro-
vided by law, be liable to a penalty equal to the total amount of the tax evaded,
or not collected or not accounted for and paid over. No penalty shall be im-
posed under section 6653 for any offense to which this section is applicable.
The requirement that the responsible person willfully fails to collect the trust fund
taxes has been interpreted to require "voluntary, conscious and intentional" preference
for payment of corporate creditors over the United States. Bloom v. United States,
272 F.2d 215, 223 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 803 (1960). The sec-
tion does not require an evil motive to render a party liable. See Cable, supra
at 508-09. See also Yukin, Corporate Officers in Increasing Numbers Face Penal-
ties for Default on Withholding Taxes, 18 JOURNAL OF TAXAToN 248 (1963), citing
Paddock v. Siemonect, 218 S.W. 26, 28 (Tex. 1944); Bloom v. United States, 272 F.2d
215 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 803 (1960); Griswold v. United States,
209 F. Supp. 98 (S.D. Calif. 1962). Cf. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389
(1933). But see Cushan v. Wood, 149 F. Supp. 644, 646 (D.C. Ariz. 1966), where
the basic elements of willfulness were considered to be evil motive, lack of justifica-
tion, bad purpose or something done or not done without justifiable excuse.
13. Reagan & Co. v. United States, 290 F. Supp. 470, 479-80 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
14. See Girard Trust Corn Exch. Bank v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 215 (E.D.
Pa. 1966).
15. United States v. Hill, 368 F.2d 617, 621 (5th Cir. 1966).
16. Pacific Nat'l Ins. Co. v. United States, 422 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1970); Regan
& Co. v. United States, 290 F. Supp. 470 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). In Regan the taxpayer
was president of a corporation formed to execute and perform a prime contract with
the Army and was in overall charge of the entire project. Funds from Regan's firm
were diverted directly to the subcontractor. Originally the president of the subcon-
tracting company signed all checks including those for payroll taxes. A dispute arose
as to the use of the transferred funds and the procedure was changed so that the de-
fendant opened a new account for the benefit of the subcontractor, but in which only
the defendant-taxpayer and another officer of the prime contractor had the authority
to draw checks. The court held that the person liable for payment of payroll taxes is
not limited to the employer but includes the one whose discretion is exercised in
finally deciding which creditors are to be paid and when. A factor which was given
weight was the desire of the prime contractor to use the subcontractor's employees
but without entering into an employer-employee relationship with them. The court
noted that this was proper if the prime contractor had merely advanced sufficient
funds to cover wages. The court rejected taxpayer's argument that it was not until
§ 3505 was enacted, subsequent to the time the acts which the defendant was accused
of were committed, that he or the corporate defendant could be held liable as a "third
party paying or providing for wages." 290 F. Supp. at 478 et seq.
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tice of net payroll financing.' 7
SECTION 3505
Congressional recognition that the existing Code provisions could not
be utilized to remedy net payroll financing prompted the passage of
section 3505.1s The section subjects lenders, sureties"9 or other persons
to liability for withholding taxes for funds advanced directly20 or indi-
rectly2 to pay the wages of other person's employees.22 To date, sec-
tion 3505 has resulted in a minimum of litigation, and on this basis
may, perhaps, be judged as successful. Still, an examination of the
provision and legislative history reveals several uncertainties which may
precipitate litigation.
Third party liability under section 3505(a) and (b) for the pay-
ment of withholding taxes extends to "lenders, sureties and other per-
sons." 3  The use of the categories of lender and surety in conjunction
with the category "other person" may indicate that the "other person"
Similarly, in Pacific National it was held that, "Section 6672 imposes a liability
separate and distinct from the employer's liability for the withheld taxes, and it imposes
that liability upon persons other than the employer. . . ." 442 F.2d at 30. The
court held that the section reaches those who have "the final word as to what bills
should or should not be paid and when." Id. at 31, citing Wilson v. United States,
250 F.2d 312, 316 (9th Cir. 1958). Accord, Dunham v. United States, 301 F. Supp.
700 (D. Conn. 1969). The gloss put on § 6672 by the courts in Regan, Pacific and
Dunham may be largely accounted for by their desire to render a third party liable for
conduct which would have subjected them to liability under § 3505, but for the fact
that the acts complained of occurred prior to the effective date of the section. The
legislative history of § 6672 provides strong evidence that the section was intended to
reach only employers. S. REP. No. 1182, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2188 (1958). Accord,
United States v. Hill, 368 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1966).
17. S. REP. No. 1182, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2188 (1958), hypothesizes a situation
under § 6672 in which a prime contractor advances money to a subcontractor: "The
prime contractor in this case, since he is responsible for the completion of the job
is willing to provide the net wage payments but since he is not the 'employer' cannot
be required to provide the taxes to be withheld by the 'employer'."
18. S. REP. No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1966) noted:
Under present law only "employers" are liable for income, social security
and railroad retirement taxes required to be withheld and deducted for
wages.
19. See, e.g., Gallagher, The Good and the Bad for Surety Companies Under the
Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, 34 INS. COUNSEL J. 214, 218, for a discussion of § 3505
as it applies to sureties.
20. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 3505(a).
21. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 3505(b).
22. Amounts paid by the third party for withholding taxes are credited to the em-
ployee. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 3505(c).
23. INT. Ray. CODE of 1954, § 3505.
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who pays wages must stand in a formal relationship established
by agreement with the party for whose benefit funds are advanced, like
the relationship between a lender and his debtor, or a surety and its
assured. There is some support for this view in the legislative history.24
If a contractor were to advance his subcontractor funds for the payment
of wages with or without expectation of repayment, he would appar-
ently be within the ambit of section 3505. The contractor-subcon-
tractor relationship is a formal one, established by agreement. On the
other hand if the relatives or friends of the owner of a failing business
were to give him funds to pay his employee, section 3505 may be in-
applicable, since the person advancing the funds and the person receiv-
ing the funds would stand in no formal relationship. Yet, the necessity
of a formal relationship is uncertain, and the persons donating funds
under the latter factual situation may be subject to the provisions of
section 3505.
According to the legislative history, the only third party who may
advance funds2 5 used for the payment of another's employee's wages
and who is exempted from liability under section 3505 is the lender
of a working capital loan.26 Neither the Code nor the legislative his-
tory define working capital or working capital loan. Presumably, how-
ever, the exemption anticipates situations where money is loaned for
payment of capital expenditures arising in the course of a business
undertaking, including the payment of wages.2" Doubt concerning
the meaning of working capital may create confusion, since it is unclear
to what extent a party may advance funds for payment of wages and
be exempted from section 3505.28
24. S. REP. No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1966) noted:
The reference to "other person" in this provision is intended to include any-
one similar to a lender or surety who pays the wages of employers of an-
other out of his funds.
25. Funds are advanced for the specific purpose of paying wages where the sup-
plier of funds knows that the funds are to be used for wages at the time of the ad-
vance even though the agreement under which the wages are advanced states a differ-
ent purpose. The legislative history also evinces an intent to exempt those acting as
agents of the employer or employee who pay but who do not provide funds for wages.
26. H.R. REP. No. 1184, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1966).
27. Cases have defined "working capital" as the "value of that with which an en-
terprise carries on its activity." Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. McKay Prod.
Corp., 178 F.2d 639, 642 (3d Cir. 1949). See also Alaska S.S. Co. v. Federal Maritime
Comm'n, 344 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1965); ln re Diamond State Tel. Co., 51 Del. 525,
149 A.2d 324 (1959). See the discussion at note 35 infra and accompanying text.
28. H.R. REP. No. 1184, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1966), notes that funds are
advanced for the specific purpose of paying wages where the supplier of funds knows
[Vol. 1972:767
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Section 3505(a) subjects a third party who directly pays the wages
of another's employees to liability for withholding taxes.29 The liability
of such a party arises only when the employer fails to pay the taxes, 30
but once this occurs, the third party is liable for a sum equal to the un-
paid taxes with interest." Under section 3505(b), third parties are
liable for withholding taxes due on funds advanced to pay wages indi-
rectly through an employer or other person." Unlike subsection (a),
subsection (b) of section 3505 limits the amount recoverable from a
third party to twenty-five percent of the amount supplied to the em-
ployer and used for wages. 33 Subsection (b) is not as easily applied
as subsection (a); two conditions must be met before the third party
becomes liable. First, the lender, surety, or other person must advance
funds to or for the account of an employer for the "specific purpose"
of paying wages. Second, the third party must have "actual notice or
knowledge" that the employer does not intend to or will not be able to
make timely payment or deposit of withholding taxes. 4
The meaning of the phrase "for the specific purpose of paying
wages" in section 3505(b) is unclear. It may be urged that the phrase
means exclusively for, or restricted to, the purpose of paying wages.
On the other hand, the phrase may mean "explicitly," but not "exclu-
sively" for the payment of wages. If the former alternative is taken,
a third party furnishing funds used in part for the payment of wages
would fall outside the ambit of section 3505(b). Any doubt with re-
spect to the meaning of the phrase should be resolved in favor of finding
such parties liable for withholding taxes. If courts were to hold that
"specific" meant "exclusive," third parties could easily avoid the conse-
quences of section 3505(b) by advancing funds to pay wages along
with a nominal sum for other purposes. Yet, such an interpretation
may be in accord with at least some of the legislative history. As noted
that the funds are to be used for wages even though the written agreement under which
the advances are made states a different purpose. See text accompanying note 35 infra.
29. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 3505(a).
30. S. REP. No. 1183, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1966).
31. Id.
32. INT. REV. CODE of 1954,§ 3505(b).
33. Id.
34. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 3505.
35. "Specific" was defined in People v. Thomas, 25 Cal. 2d 880, 898, 156 P.2d
7, 17 (1945) (criminal case involving meaning of specific intent): "restricted, defi-
nite, explicit of an exact nature." Accord, People v. Johnson, 191 Cal. App. 2d 694,
702, 13 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6 (1961).
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earlier, Congress intended to exempt the makers of working capital
loans from the operation of section 3505. Working capital loans may
include funds which are used in part to pay wages86 and therefore, con-
stitute one type of transaction where partial use of funds for wages is
outside the purview of section 3505(b). Only working capital loans,
however, are recognized as an exemption by the legislative history, and
their exclusion does not compel the conclusion that all transactions in-
volving the partial use of funds to pay wages are outside the coverage
of section 3505.
To be liable under section 3505(b), a business which advances
funds for the specific purpose of paying wages must have "actual notice
or knowledge" that the employer receiving the funds does not intend
to, or will not be able to make timely payment or deposits of the with-
holding taxes due. Section 6323(i)(1)3 7 provides inter alia that an
organization will be deemed to have actual notice or knowledge of a
fact if such a fact is brought to its attention or if the exercise of due
diligence would have revealed such a fact."8
The due diligence requirement of section 6323(i)(1) places a bur-
den upon the third party providing funds to make an inquiry concern-
ing the ability or intent of the employer who receives money for the
specific purpose of paying wages to pay withholding taxes. If the
third party fails to make such an inquiry and the inquiry would have
revealed the inability of the employer to pay withholding taxes, the
supplier of funds is deemed to have actual knowledge or notice of such
facts and is subject to liability under section 3505 (b) even though such
facts were not brought to his attention.
It is unclear how thorough a third party's investigation must be in
order to meet the due diligence requirements. The meaning of due dil-
igence under section 6323(i)(1) has not been litigated.39 Courts faced
36. S. REP. No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1966).
37. IT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6323(i) (1). The committee reports indicate that
§ 6323(i)(1) was adopted from the 1962 amendments to the Uniform Commercial
Code. S. REP. No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1966).
38. The use of the terms "actual notice and knowledge" in § 3505(b) seems mis-
leading, since a party may be charged with liability under the section when he has no
real notice or knowledge of an employer's inability to pay withholding taxes or in-
tent not to do so. Thus, the "actual notice and knowledge" test does not establish
a party's liability on the basis of his subjective awareness of the situation, but rather
according to an objective "reasonable man" standard.
39. Nor have state court decisions construing the Uniform Commercial Code pro-
vision from which § 6323(i) (1) was adopted passed on the point. INT. REv. CODE
[Vol. 1972:767
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with this question in differing contexts have indicated that the issue
must be decided in each case in light of the relevant circumstances4"
and on the basis of the degree of diligence normally exercised by a rea-
sonably prudent man.41  It may be that the very presence of section
3505 imposes a rather heavy burden on the reasonably prudent man.
Nevertheless, the duty of the person providing funds to inquire into
the affairs of the person receiving funds is not unlimited. The legis-
lative history indicates that the duty of the third person who provides
funds to inquire into the intent or ability of the recipient to pay with-
holding taxes extends only to the time of actual advancement of the
funds. 2
CONCLUSION
With the passage of section 3505, Congress has removed judicial
precedent which obstructed the collection of withholding taxes when
contractors or sureties provided funds for wages of another's employees.
Unfortunately, the effectiveness of section 3505 may be impaired by
the use of inadequate definitions and unclear terminology. Particularly
the failure to indicate the meaning of "working capital loan" in the
legislative history and the failure to define "specific purpose" under
section 3505(b) may stimulate litigation. Litigation may also be pre-
cipitated by congressional failure to prescribe how thorough a third
party's inquiries must be to satisfy the due diligence requirements of
of 1954, § 6323 (i) (1 ), provides that an organization exercises due diligence,
if it maintains reasonable routines for communicating significant information
to the person conducting the transaction and there is reasonable compliance
with the routine.
40. Davis v. State, 245 Ala. 589, 591, 18 So. 2d 282, 284 (1944); Krieger's Clean-
ers and Dryers, Inc. v. Benner, 123 Ohio St. 482, 175 N.E. 857 (1931).
41. In South Milwaukee Boulevard Heights Co. v. Harte, 95 Wis. 592, 596,
70 N.W. 821, 822-23 (1897), the court gave an instruction to the jury that "by due
diligence is meant such diligence as ordinary prudent men would use .... ." See
also the discussion in A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW FRAUD § 7.2(4) (d), at 154.1-
154.2 (1969), discussing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971): "The secondary test for violation ...
as laid down by the Second Circuit in TGS is whether the issuance of the release
'resulted from a lack of due diligence'. The diligence test is applied only if the
information is found misleading by the reasonable man test. . . ." (Emphasis added.)
Liability under the due diligence test may be imposed for mere negligence. SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., supra at 860. In order to present a due diligence defense
a party must establish that he has put forth the requisite effort; in Kennedy v. Craw-
ford, 138 Pa. 561, 569, 21 A. 19, 20 (1890) the court noted, "Due diligence requires
some overt effort, it is not satisfied by surrender without attempt."
42. H.R. REp. No. 1184, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1966).
Vol. 1972:7671
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section 6323(i)(1). Yet the lack of clarity in section 3505 may
serve a positive function. Although clearer definitions might make
the section easier to apply, greater precision would probably result in
loss of flexibility. Narrow definitions of transactions to which section
3505 applies might tempt parties to devise methods of advancing funds
calculated to circumvent those definitions. More flexible, albeit less
clear, definitions allow the Commissioner and the courts to shape third
party liability for withholding taxes in accordance with the realities of
business practices.
Section 3505 imposes heavy burdens on lenders and sureties who
advance funds to contractors and other employers. Especially burden-
some is the requirement that third persons advancing funds must exer-
cise due diligence in ascertaining whether the funds advanced are to be
used specifically for the payment of wages, and if so, whether the
recipient has the ability and intent to pay withholding taxes. Third
persons subject to potential liability under section 3505 may encounter
difficulty in determining the amount of withholding taxes due, since they
may not have access to payroll information. Congress, however, was
fully warranted in placing liability for the payment of withholding taxes
on third parties providing funds for wages in view of the considerable loss
of revenue which the Treasury suffered as a result of net payroll financ-
ing.4 With the increased use of the subcontracting device, section 3505
will become an increasingly important provision.44
43. The construction industry, in which the practice of net payroll financing was
most widespread, accounted in 1964 for only five percent of industrial "trust fund"
taxes; however, the construction industry accounted for twenty-eight percent of the
trust fund uncollectables in that year. Hearings on H.R. 11256 Before a Subcomn. of
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1966).
44. As of the date of this article, § 3505 has been applied only twice. In United
States v. Algernon Glair, Inc., 441 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1971), the prime contractor
paid the wages of its subcontractor's employees. The security interest which was
given by Blair to its subcontractor recited in part, "Whereas Whitehead [subcon-
tractor] has performed a portion of said sub-contract and has exhausted its funds and
can obtain no financing by which it can meet its payrolls and pay for the material
needed to complete said subcontract." Id. at 1380. This statement the court felt
was conclusive evidence that met the "knowledge of insolvency" requirement. Id.
at 1381. In addition, the contractor was told a number of times by I.R.S. agents
that his subcontractor was not paying taxes due.
The prime contractor fared no better in United States v. Whilmar Gen. Contractors,
P-H 1970 FED. TAXEs, EST. & GIFT (Am. Fed. Tax R.2d) 70-606 (N.D. Tex.
Jan. 29, 1970), where the court held that since the prime contractor had been apprised
of the subcontractor's inability to pay withholding taxes, he had actual knowledge
within the meaning of § 3505.
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